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Résumé 
 
Ce rapport de recherche se propose de dégager les principaux 
déterminants de la performance économique tels que considérés par l’approche 
institutionnelle de la croissance économique dans le domaine de l’économie du 
développement. Le fondement théorique de cette approche affirme que l’ultime 
cause de la croissance est la structure institutionnelle de la société, structure 
qui détermine le comportement des individus dans la société. Cette théorie est 
sujette à des tests empiriques, avec différents travaux sur la croissance qui 
emploient différentes mesures des institutions. Ici, l’on s’attardera sur 
l’approche institutionnelle telle qu’exprimée dans Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson (2000). Également, nous voulons décrire deux possible critiques de 
cette approche : la vue géographique et celle néo-classique sur le 
développement. Nous conclurons avec un nombre de questions que cette 
littérature a laissée sans réponse, attendu que l’on peut se demander pourquoi 
on ne trouve jamais des modèles théoriques de la croissance, mais seulement 
des articles empiriques.  
 
Mots clés : approche institutionnelle, approche géographique, croissance, 
économie du développement, théorie de la convergence.  
 
Abstract 
 
This report wishes to illustrate the main findings of institutionalism 
about the fundamental determinants of economic performance. The theoretical 
foundation of this approach to growth states that the ultimate cause of growth 
is the institutional structure of the society, as this structure determines the 
behaviour of individuals in that society. This theory is subjected to empirical 
testing, with different papers trying different measures of institutions to 
account for growth. Here, we will try to evaluate the institutional view as 
expressed in Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2000). Additionally, we wish to 
describe two possible critiques of this view: the geographical view on 
development economics, and the neo-classical approach to growth. We will 
conclude our paper with a number of questions that this literature has left 
unresolved, as we can wonder why there haven’t been any theoretical models 
of the institutional view, but only empirical papers. 
 
 
Key words: institutionalism, growth, development economics, 
geographical view, theory of convergence. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
An important aspect of economic research concerns economic growth, the evolution of 
output per capita over time. Since Adam Smith and David Ricardo, a number of theories have 
tried to explain growth or suggest reasons why it should be encouraged. Through Adam 
Smith’s preoccupation with the “wealth of nations”, or Ricardo’s arguments in favor of free 
trade as a source of improving one’s economy, obtaining a better performance out of 
economic factors has been a constant effort of thought and research. 
Recent models of growth, Solow-Swan model in the 50’s and Romer and Lucas in the 
80’s, have tried to analyze long-run growth analytically in order to find the causes underlining 
it. The neo-classical growth model posits a theory of convergence between countries with 
different growth rates. This theory shows that rich countries’ growth rates increase up to a 
certain point until they reach their steady-state, where these rates become zero. The theory of 
convergence thus predicts that poor countries have higher growth rates, and eventually will 
converge towards the output levels of rich countries. Growth in this model is primarily driven 
by technological change as an exogenous parameter. As little evidence of convergence was 
found empirically, the endogenous model of growth proposed a different perspective for this 
cause of growth. It concentrated on the effects of human capital accumulation, knowledge and 
innovation on growth, thus treating technology as an endogenous parameter.  
However, these theories have not been able to provide a sufficient explanation for the 
observed growth inequalities in the world. We do not know why productivities across 
countries differ, why some countries have a high rate of growth while others do not, and what 
are the causes of considerable differences in incomes across countries. It is certain that 
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accumulations of human capital matters, as well as the allocation of resources, but is there a 
more fundamental cause of growth? 
While research in growth theory continued, the line of study moved toward a socially 
and politically aware area. Development economics especially couldn’t be isolated from other 
facets of reality if an encompassing explanation was to be found. This is the main objection of 
institutionalism to neo-classical theory of growth. As North and Thomas (1973), its early 
defenders, point out: «the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, 
capital accumulation etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth» (italics in original)1. For 
them, a true cause of growth would be the institutions a country has. Institutions are the 
warrant of laws and rights affecting the incentives a person faces, defining what is possible 
and what isn’t possible to do in a particular society or «the rules of the game» as North likes 
to say.  
Hall and Jones (1999) showed that, in a regular OLS regression of log output per 
worker on human capital2 and physical capital, the residual explained most of the variation in 
worker’s productivity. This test revealed the difficulty of the basic question of development 
economics: why, given that advanced technology is universally available at present, there are 
still such enormous differences in productivity, and thus of wealth, across countries? Neo-
classical theory states only that different technologies produce different growth rates, but 
cannot explain why there are still such technology differences. The example of Japan comes 
to mind, when considering the catching-up hypothesis, but then why didn’t this technological 
progress take place for most African countries also in the past century?   
                                                 
1Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2004), “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth”, in Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1, Edition 1, edited by Philippe Aghion and 
Steven Durlauf, 2005, p. 1. 
2 Here, human capital is the average educational attainment, measured in 1985, as in Barro and Lee (1993). 
Physical capital is measured using a perpetual inventory method, with investment data going back at least till 
1970. The output per worker is taken from Penn World Tables Mark 5.6, with adjustment for natural resources, 
as for the mining industry.   
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Hall and Jones (1999)’s answer was to instrument for a measure of institutions, as 
institutions is an endogenous parameter, depending on the level of growth, in order to show 
that the differences in productivity can be explained by how «good» or «bad» institutions of 
that country are. Others have chosen a different answer. For example, Knack and Keefer 
(1997), the initiators in the literature on institutions of employing Political Risk Services data 
as measure of property rights (Knack and Keefer 1995), investigate whether this variable is 
rather dependent on forms of «social capital», as defined by Putnam (1993). They use a 
measure of «trust» from surveys to take into account the level of social cohesion. According 
to Putnam’s analysis, the importance of civic society can lower costs of transactions, and thus 
a better cohesion explains a more prosperous economic outcome.  
Hence the modern line of research isn’t focusing solely on institutions in trying to 
explain why progress wasn’t as rapid or practically absent from other parts of the world. 
Other explanations may involve cultural reasons, or geographical ones. The cultural view 
could be traced back to Max Weber (1930), for whom the rise of capitalism is due in part to 
the Protestant ethic, in particular Calvinism. This cultural hypothesis appears in the empirical 
literature either as search of correlation between religious beliefs and GDP per capita (Barro 
and McCleary 2003), or a particular cultural background (Véliz 1994), the influence of 
Iberian heritage on Latin American growth as opposed to Anglo-Saxon heritage of North 
America).  
The geographical view also has had a long history. De Montesquieu wrote in mid-18th 
century about the influence of climate on people’s behavior and work productivity. He 
suggests that a warmer climate may induce laziness, whereas temperate regions, like France, 
are ideal for the spirit (De Montesquieu 1748). Recently, economic research explored the 
relation between climate, temperature and output growth. For example, Masters and 
McMillan (2001) show that countries with winter frost have higher GDP. Gallup, Sachs and 
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Mellinger (1998), McArthur and Sachs (2000), illustrate the importance of geography in 
general, whereas Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup and Sachs (2001), Sachs et Malaney (2002), 
Kiszewski et al (2004), all concentrate on the burden of disease environment, with particular 
attention paid to malaria. Geography also seems to influence workers’ productivity, as well as 
costs of education, health, investment and savings, population growth and other variables 
which represent the growth in the neo-classical models.  
In our survey of the growth literature, we wish to focus on the main arguments of the 
most recent research on growth, in particular institutionalism. In this paper, we will try to 
evaluate the institutional view as expressed in a very influential article by Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson (2000) (AJR hereafter). We will report two major critiques that seemed the most 
relevant for the question of growth, which are represented by two papers that embody these 
two different theoretical perspectives. First, we will look at the geographical objections to the 
primacy of institutions, with particular attention to Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998) (GSM 
hereafter). Second, we will return to classical theory of growth, taking into account the 
arguments of Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and Shleifer (2004) (GLLS hereafter), as 
they prove the frailty of institutional measures and difficulty in assessing causality in such a 
matter.  
Our paper considers the institutional view as an exploratory start. We would like to 
illustrate the main findings of this view about the fundamental determinants of economic 
performance. The theoretical foundation of this approach to growth states that the ultimate 
cause of growth is the institutional structure of the society, as this structure determines the 
behaviour of individuals in that society. Given the institutional structure, one can then look 
for what is and isn’t possible to achieve in terms of economic performance. This theory is 
subjected to empirical testing, with different papers trying different measures of institutions to 
account for growth. We have chosen AJR (2000), as this paper exemplifies this theory at its 
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best. The ingenuity of the tests places this paper at the forefront of the literature on institutions, 
making it the seminal paper in the field.  
Additionally, we wish to describe two possible critiques of this paper. The institutional 
view still encounters resistance on the part of researchers in growth theory, and this due to 
very specific reasons. First of all, we shall examine the geographical view, because this view 
poses a very important question for the causality problem. Geography is the only exogenous 
parameter that can influence growth, and thus it is legitimate to ask whether this actually is 
the fundamental cause of growth. Such a perspective would place the institutional framework 
on a secondary place, rendering it less important for growth.  Secondly, we will inspect the 
validity of the institutional view’s strategy of empirical examination. This theory has departed 
from the traditional, neo-classical, way of conducting empirical research on growth, 
motivated especially by the problems encountered by convergence theory’s problematic fit 
with reality. But has this strategy improved the results? In other words, did this strategy arrive 
at explaining the growth in real world? GLLS show us how this strategy failed, or at least 
partially failed, as it has not yet become the all-encompassing explanation behind growth.  
We will conclude our paper with a number of questions that this literature has left 
unresolved. After reading many empirical papers on growth, we can wonder why there 
haven’t been any theoretical models of the institutional view. We see that different empirical 
tests seem to predict some influence of institutions on growth, but at a theoretical level, none 
have tried to prove these findings. We wonder whether this is not because of more and more 
emphasis on history in these economic studies, a social science which has its own rules, but 
especially lacking predicting power. The conclusion of most of the literature is that a higher 
attention paid to the particular situations and diversity of human peoples around the world is 
key to a better understanding of growth. This is an important aspect, as it implies serious 
consequences for policy-makers: recommendations for improving economic performance 
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might be to start from scratch as a consequence of this research. The neo-classical framework, 
applied to development economies didn’t produce many successes, and where there has been 
economic success, other methods seemed to have also applied (as is the case with China for 
example).  Our view is that one has to be careful when categorizing different regions around 
the globe with the same standard, as this might not reveal anything pertinent about the true 
state of the world economy, nor what can be done to improve it. 
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Institutions Matter 
 
 
A Neo-Classical Theory Approach 
 
 
The neo-classical approach to growth consists of taking an aggregate production 
function as the starting point of the analysis, and then comparing the evolution of its factors 
across countries. The aggregate production function represents individual choices, as each 
individual has the option of having a firm. The assumption of neo-classical models that 
markets are perfect and productivities across countries are the same, results in an aggregate 
production function that summarizes the world economy. Therefore convergence is not only 
possible, but a definite outcome, as all countries should end up equally rich.  
As presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), convergence is predicted from the 
initial value of output, knowing the level of the steady-state3: 
[ ] ( )[ ] [ ])0(ˆ/*ˆlog/1)0(/)((log)/1( yyTexyTyT T ⋅−+=⋅ −β        (1) 
where [ ])0(/)((log)/1( yTyT ⋅  is the average growth on the time interval from 0 to T, *yˆ  is 
the steady-state value and β is the convergence coefficient. This is the basis for the later 
empirical testing. 
 The usual critique to the neo-classical growth model involves the assumptions of the 
convergence theory. One could say either that markets are not perfect and capital might not 
move the way it should, or that the returns on investment aren’t those predicted. One could 
also object to the form of the production function in general, and say that the production 
function has fixed costs, or that it doesn’t present constant returns to scale, and so on. 
Therefore, when Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) test empirically for the evolution of growth, 
                                                 
3 Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, p. 81, eq. 2.35.  
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they include a number of control and environmental variables to account for the determinants 
of growth. These controls determine the true steady-state level of the country in question.  
Thus, we have a function of growth of the form: 
;...),( 11 −−= ttt hyFDy        (2) 
where tDy is the per capita growth rate, 1−ty  is the initial output per capita, and 1−th  is the 
initial level of human capital per person, which are the state variables, and the rest (…) being 
the control variables4. For the state variable, Barro and Lee (1993) constructed a human 
capital measure, consisting of school attainment at various levels, which is used throughout 
the literature5. As control variables, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) suggest public spending 
on education, trade, political stability, and other variables employed in the literature.  
Consequently what is usually estimated is: 
iiiii ZMIY εββββ ++++= 3210)ln(        (3) 
where )ln( iY is the average income per capita, iI  are variables always included in the 
regression (such as initial levels of GPD and schooling, and health variable Life expectancy at 
birth), iM  is the variable of interest, iZ  is for other variables, potentially important as 
explanatory variables and iε  is the error term6. The coefficient 1β will show if there is or not 
convergence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995, p.421, eq. 12.1.  
5 Average years of female and male secondary and higher schooling.  
6 For an analysis of sensitivity of growth regressions of this type in the literature, see Levine and Renelt (1992).  
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The New Framework: Institutionalism 
 
 
 In order to think in a novel way about the growth that rose with institutionalism, a 
whole different range of estimations is required. As no convergence exists in this theoretical 
approach, no convergence is tested. What remains to be tested is the influence of the 
explanatory variables themselves on growth. The equation (3) above changed to: 
iiii ZMY εβββ +++= 210)ln(        (4) 
One can notice immediately that such an equation is difficult to estimate, because 
almost all the explanatory variables are correlated with growth, as well as with each other. 
The only exogenous sources of impact on growth are the geographical variables, when even 
the state of the technology was conceived as endogenous in the later neo-classical models.  In 
view of that, many empirical papers searched for possible instrumental variables for the 
different explanatory variables.  
The empirical testing of the influence of institutions had two prime solutions for 
finding a relevant enough instrument to resolve this endogeneity problem. It either employed 
geographical variables (such as the distance from the equator, by Hall and Jones (1999), as 
proxy for the Western influence), or cultural ones (as the French origin of legal system and 
origin of the colonizer by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), in studies paying particular attention to 
ancient colonies of Europe). These were not entirely convincing, as they could always be 
dependent on other factors directly affecting the growth of output per capita (geographical or 
cultural influences could have been primary). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation” is a surprising article in the literature on 
institutions, because it constitutes a break with the paradigm of previous research. AJR’s 
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innovation comes from finding an instrument which has no other meaning than being an 
econometric measure, and thus facilitating the discussion on the influence of institutions.  
AJR’s fundamental contribution lies in the ingenuity of their instrumental variable in 
regressions of growth, and thus launching a new trend of regressions on historical variables. 
Their instrument is the European settler mortality in the colonies between the 17th and 19th 
century7. Their choice of instrument is motivated as follows: “Colonies where Europeans 
faced higher mortality rates are today substantially poorer than colonies that were healthy for 
Europeans.”8 When Europeans colonized other regions of the world, where they encountered 
difficulties in settling in large numbers, they created «extractive institutions». The extractive 
institutions existed through exploitation of local population and persisted to the present day as 
«bad» institutions, detrimental to growth. Where Europeans managed to settle, they replicated 
their home institutions, protecting individual rights to a higher degree, and giving way to the 
«good» institutions of today.  
They claim their instrument is valid: first, because settler mortality in the past does not 
influence in any way income per capita today, and second, because of the chain of causality 
relating settler mortality to current institutions. This chain of causality is: where the mortality 
rate was lower, colonizers from Europe made settlements, created early institutions, which 
then persisted through time, became embodied in the current institutions, and now influence 
the current economic performance of these countries. 
The equation they are testing9 is: 
iiii Ry εγαμ +Χ++= 'log        (5) 
where iylog is the economic outcome (GDP per capita 1995 PPP adjusted) , iR  is the measure 
of institutions (Protection against expropriation Risk Index10), 'iΧ  represents other variables 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for a discussion on the construction of the sample for this instrument.   
8Acemoglu Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: 
An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, vol. 91(5), 2001, p. 1370. 
9 We report the equations as they appear in AJR’s paper.  
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influencing GDP, ε  is the error term and α , the coefficient they are looking for, which 
represents the impact of institutions on growth of GDP.  
They also want to show that their instrument of institutions affects growth through the 
desired causality: from settler mortality ( iM ) to past settlement in colonies (European 
population in 1900, iS ), to early institutions (circa 1900, iC ), to current institutions ( iR ).   
RiCiiRRi CR υγβλ +Χ++= '        (6) 
CiCiiCCi SC υγβλ +Χ++= '         (7) 
SiSiiSSi MS υγβλ +Χ++= 'log         (8) 
Knowing 0),( ≠iiRCov ε , as we know that institutions are endogenous with respect to 
economic development (countries with higher levels of income investing in better institutions), 
if iM , settler mortality, is a valid instrument, then:  
0),( ≠ii MRCov        (a) 
0),( =iiMCov ε        (b) 
and the valid identification strategy for α , would be a 2SLS regression, with the first stage 
being: 
iiii MR υδβζ +Χ++= 'log        (9) 
After verifying the channels of causation through regressions of equations 6, 7, 8, and 
finding close relationships, they give the results of their IV estimation (equation 9 and 5). 
Because of the confirmation of the chain of causality with high correlations between variables, 
and the theoretical respect of the conditions a, b, for the instrumental variable, the problem of 
reverse causality and omitted variables is considered resolved. The difference between the 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Political and Risk Services are a private company which provides data on risk of investing in each country 
mainly for foreign investors. Knack and Keefer (1995) showed that this measure of foreign investment is highly 
correlated with domestic investment. It is a good proxy for a certain level of institutions comparable worldwide 
because foreign investment is considered more homogeneous across countries. 
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OLS estimate of α , 0.54, compared to the estimate of the IV regression, 0.94, shows that the 
measurement error bias is higher then reverse causality bias, and consequently nothing seems 
unusual about the IV regression11.  
As it appears in Table 1, this estimation of a highly significant influence of institutions 
on growth doesn’t depend on the «Neo-Europes» (Canada, United-States, Australia and New 
Zealand): the estimate for α  increases only a little, to 1.28, showing increased importance of 
institutions for growth, as expected. Another issue is Africa, which changes slightly the 
results: without African countries, α  is still high, 0.58. This implies that Africa doesn’t have 
growth, especially because of its poor institutions and not because of cultural or geographical 
differences (if the latter would have been the case, it should have influenced the whole sample, 
but the coefficient on growth seems to have stayed the same)12. A curious result is the non-
significance of geography as captured by latitude variable. This is the first point of 
controversy which motivated AJR robustness checks. 
Robustness checks first surprise by the fact that they eliminate cultural differences as a 
possible explanation of growth, as British and French origin dummies are almost irrelevant 
for the results (the same irrelevance of culture demonstrated above with the continent 
dummies, as we have seen with Africa). AJR’s conclusion is that the previous literature, 
emphasizing the British system of laws, saw this as better than anyone else’s by pure chance: 
the British just had more colonies where Europeans could safely settle. The second surprise 
comes from the analysis of the disease environment and the impact of geography. AJR prove 
that geography affects income only indirectly, through their effect on institutions. 
                                                 
11 AJR consider instrumenting the institutions variable with another institutional measure (constraints on the 
executive), to see how large the measurement error is, and they conclude it has the right order of magnitude. 
12 Another theoretical objection against geographical reasons for which Africa would be poorer, is the fact that 
local populations usually have higher immunity to their disease environment, even when this was lethal for 
foreigners, Europeans, in the present study. Therefore they should have been able to create means of growth for 
themselves, as Europeans did in their native region. We will see later on the problems with this argument.  
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The question of whether the disease environment or other geographical variables 
affect output per capita directly is crucial, because it could accordingly invalidate their IV 
strategy. If the instrument used - settler mortality of colonizers in the past - is correlated to the 
current disease environment, then settler mortality might not be a good instrument of 
institutions, or a weak one. We can see in Table 2 that none of the usual health variable used 
in the literature is significant, except infant mortality. As health in general is endogenous with 
respect to the level of wealth, AJR expect the estimate on institutions to be smaller, but it is 
still highly significant (0.55 with infant mortality as geographical variable in the regression).  
AJR’s theoretical conceptions of growth have been empirically tested in this article: 
the institutional structure is the primary cause of growth, all other variables having at most an 
indirect influence through the institutional framework. They admit that the measures for 
institutions are very relative at this point of the research, and it is not at all clear what an 
improvement of institutions would mean. They refrain from practical recommendations. 
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Critiques to Institutionalism 
 
 
The Geographical Critique 
 
 
The first question that comes to mind about the instrument that AJR uses in an 
analysis of the causes of growth, is whether this instrument is itself related to income per 
capita today, as it might be related to current disease environment. If it is the current disease 
environment that affects GDP growth, it means that geography would be a more accurate 
direct cause of growth, and institutions would be an outcome of this circumstance. If 
geography is the primary cause of growth, than AJR’s strategy didn’t work, as they would not 
have been able to prove that it’s the institutions that matter more.  
McArthur and Sachs (2000) answer AJR by asking how could geography not 
influence directly the growth of output per capita today, if they admit it did influence it in the 
past, even to the point of giving rise to the wrong or good institutions. Geography should then 
still influence the working conditions, the agricultural productivity, the fertility rate, and so on. 
It is rather the institutions that are constantly influenced by geography. The authors believe 
that AJR’s result comes mainly from bias created by the sample size which doesn’t permit 
enough variation in geographical climates. Indeed, the reduced number of countries chosen by 
AJR are mostly tropical or sub-tropical, so there is no possible influence of different climate 
situations to be observed13.  
AJR’s main response to the geographical view has been another article, AJR (2002), 
which raises the question of the «Reversal of Fortunes» for countries through history. If the 
geography would be the main determinant of development, then no radical change could ever 
                                                 
13 AJR’s answer to this critique was that they included countries like the Neo-Europes in their sample, and that 
these provide enough variation… 
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appear with time, as those geographical differences should be the same. This is certainly the 
best argument against the geographical view, but there remain a few factual problems. If there 
has been some reversal of fortunes in the past, as with the Caribbean Islands, the only 
significant reversal remains the so called Neo-Europes (US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zeeland). If one looks at the latest Maddison data set, the rule seems to be the opposite: 
tropical countries were poor and still are14. Empirically, the reversal seems to be the exception, 
and maybe reasons to each singular case can be found. 
But for AJR, the claim that institutions shape the economic environment in the first 
place extends itself to the African countries, which is an understandable quest for coherence. 
For example, AJR stress the immunity of local peoples to malaria, the primary cause of death 
in the colonies, and the inherent basis of the settler mortality measure. Their suggestion is that 
this disease environment is a relevant measure of institutions also because it only affected the 
Europeans trying to colonize those countries. If it would have affected everybody, then the 
distinction between those who did create good institutions and those who didn’t would rest 
entirely on those particular people, either through their culture, or different knowledge15.  
The problem with this argument is that studies on malaria show that even though 
immunity can be acquired at a young age, and quite rapidly (up to two months), this immunity 
also is lost just as easily (within a year) when the population moves to a different region16. 
AJR themselves admit that there were high mortality rates for African laborers, taken as 
slaves across Africa, or brought to America!  
The malaria burden seems quite important when examined in greater detail. An adult 
receives hundreds of biting of mosquitoes per year. Thus his work productivity is reduced by 
hours of work lost on frequent recoveries. If a person moves to another city in search for a job, 
                                                 
14 See Przeworski (2004 a) for a direct answer to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). We will come back 
to this in our conclusion. 
15 These two possibilities are in fact an alternative perspective, and have been tested as such, as we will see in the 
analysis of our last article, that looks for influence of human capital. 
16 See Sachs and Malaney (2002), Kiszewski and al. (2004) for more details.  
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it is very unlikely that this person would be willing to go back, as it incurs the risk of illness 
again and therefore labor mobility will be drastically reduced in those regions. School 
absenteeism for children translates itself in lower human capital and higher costs of education. 
All these effects, as well as other costs of disease environment (like health care costs for 
treatment and prevention, hired labor to compensate for morbidity within household, foreign 
investment etc.), make malaria an important factor for development. 
Sachs (2003) tests for influence of geography on GDP growth, reproducing AJR’s 
sample, as well as two other samples of studies showing the primacy of institutions on 
growth17. To show the impact of malaria, he uses an instrument called Malaria Ecology (ME), 
because malaria is endogenous with respect to wealth, inasmuch as health measures could 
contribute to lowering a possible death rate. This instrument is constructed by Kiszewski et al 
(2004) and takes into account the temperature as well as the density and different types of 
fatal mosquitos18. Being constructed on climatological factors, ME is exogenous to programs 
of public health and to individual’s revenue. 
The equation to be estimated19 is the same as in AJR: 
iiii ZQIY εβββ +++= 210 ')ln(        (10) 
where )ln( iY is the income per capita (log GDP PPP adjusted 1995), iQI is the measure for 
institutional quality (here we will have three: expropriation risk used by AJR, and an index of 
institutions from Kaufman, et al. (1999, 2002), used by Easterly and Levine (2002) and 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) respectively), iZ  is for other variables, such as 
geographical variables, that have an impact on GDP and iε  is the error term. 
                                                 
17 The samples he uses are from: AJR (2000), Easterly and Levine (2002), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2002) (RST hereafter). 
18 Temperature is important because the parasite in the mosquito needs a life-cycle to become infectious, and if 
the temperature is lower, the mosquito takes longer to accomplish that life-cycle, if it ever gets there (below 16 
degrees it becomes unlikely for the mosquito to survive long enough). This is the basis for tests on temperate 
climate or seasonality in studies like Masters and McMillan (2001) on winter frost, for example.  
19 As presented in Sachs (2003). 
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Sachs tests whether geography has no direct impact on income growth, and as a result 
he is testing whether the null hypothesis on 2β  cannot be rejected, knowing that the 
geographical variable he will use will be a malaria index. 
The instruments employed are the settler mortality variable, created by AJR, the 
Malaria Ecology and a variable representing the share of a country’s population in temperate 
ecozones that controls for the geographic region, in order to isolate just the contribution of the 
disease and no other geographical parameter. As seen in Table 3, the results are significant, so 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Malaria definitely seems to impinge on economic growth20. 
In a more elaborate description of the influence of geography on subsequent economic 
development, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1998) test a growth equation that can reveal if 
catching-up effects can take place. Estimating by OLS the equation for convergence of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), GSM use annual growth of GDP between 1965 and 1990, with 
initial year being 1965. We have reconstructed the equation as follows: 
iiiiii ZQIOpenLifeSYY εβββββββ +++++++= 6540302010 lnln)ln(        (11) 
where )ln( iY is the average GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990, iY0ln  is the initial GDP in 
1965, iS0  is the initial level of education in 1965, 0ln Life  is life expectancy at birth in 1965, 
Open  is a measure of the openness to trade (Sachs and Warner (1995 b)’s index), iQI is the 
measure for institutional quality (the index of institutions from Knack and Keefer 1995), iZ  is 
for other geographical variables (here: tropics, population 100 km from the coast, distance 
from the core markets, and malaria) and iε  is the error term. 
 From Table 8, we notice that GDP growth is inversely related to the initial level of 
GDP, hence confirming the convergence theory, but also establishing that being in the tropics 
                                                 
20 In Gallup and Sachs (2000), we have a list of countries that have succeeded in eradicating malaria, and see that 
none of those having a decent growth now (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, US South) were tropical, and only few 
successes exist for developing countries (these are Jamaica, Mauritius and Taiwan). The growth in these last 
countries is obviously linked to eradication of malaria. Nonetheless, see tables  4, 5, 6 and 7 for the magnitude of 
change in growth after malaria eradication.   
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highly reduces growth, as well as being affected by malaria. When geographical variables are 
introduced simultaneously, the results are weaker, indicating that either the variables are 
picking from each other some of the justification, or that there are still missing variables. For 
example malaria might end up being used as a proxy for more diseases than just one, as the 
data of this kind is hard to collect accurately, where many deaths are undeclared officially and 
some are from combinations of diseases.  
However the tests for agglomeration effects on the economy in columns 6 and 7 show 
that being a coastal economy presents a potential for positive growth, whereas having high 
densities of population landlocked reduces growth (the coefficients on log coastal and log 
inland densities are positive and, respectively, negative). A quick look at the maps render 
obvious these conclusions, by first almost perfectly mapping the evolution of malaria to the 
GDP growth, and second by predicting the large rise of population in the places most adverse 
to growth (fertility being inversely related to the level of income per capita, as investment in 
the quality of human capital rises)21.  
Unfortunately, this is the alarming conclusion of the geographical view. When 
emphasizing institutions only, essential facts are overlooked. Development economics must 
pay particular attention to geography if poverty is to ever be decreased in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Importance of Human Capital 
 
 
Another criticism to AJR (2000) comes from Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane and 
Shleifer (2004), whose first objection is the expressed skepticism towards the manipulation of 
«ideal» institutions by the institutional view. Thus GLLS review the main institutional 
                                                 
21 The maps added in the tables section at the end of this paper are taken from GSM. 
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measures employed in the literature and manage to show the limits of such measures in 
evaluating growth.  They want to show that the constraints representing the level of 
institutions are a consequence, and not a cause, of the growth of the income per capita of the 
countries in question. GLLS test their hypothesis by simultaneously comparing results on 
income growth from institutions measures and human capital accumulation.  
We show below how GLLS discredit the choice of variables as measures of 
institutions, by looking in detail at theses choices. We will then see how these measures, 
theoretically representing the bulk of the justification for economic development in the 
institutional view, compare to more classical measures, such as human capital. Here, GLLS 
go over the neo-classical approach in order to show that the new literature on growth doesn’t 
yet prevail over the traditional ways of evaluating growth. Human capital appears, in fact, to 
be a stronger predictor of growth than constraints on governments are, to take just one 
example.  
Last, we will apply this logic to AJR’s paper in particular, in order to see the problems 
that involve AJR’s strategy. The desired chain of causality, that AJR hoped for, cannot be 
certified by their method of estimation, because the instrumental variable’s method doesn’t 
say what can be inferred from it. Their instrument might stand for all sorts of other things 
influencing growth, not just for the British system of laws, as AJR would have liked. A very 
interesting illustration of this is Jared Diamond’s book «Guns, Germs and Steel. The Fates of 
Human Societies». Diamond shows that peoples settled in different regions, starting from 
geographical factors like fertility of soil for food production, or location on earth axis, which 
favoured (or not) the diffusion of agricultural techniques, animals, plants and knowledge. In 
his view, these factors were the cause of the initial settlements and they influenced the 
development of the societies. Therefore the inference that AJR make from their settler 
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mortality data to the current institutions might itself have a «deeper» cause. This is GLLS’s 
last restraint when considering the institutional literature.   
First of all, GLLS question the choice of variables representing the «institutions» of a 
country. They go back to North (1981)’s definition of institutions: on one hand, institutions 
are a «set of rules», a number of constraints on behaviour, while on the other, they must have 
some long lasting feature, a certain durability through time. As a consequence, measures of 
institutions must present these two features. But the recent literature on institutions seems to 
have chosen as measures variables that have none of these qualities. The most frequently 
employed - risk of expropriation by government, government effectiveness, constraints on the 
executive - are outcome measures, defined in function of past actions of the respective 
governments. As outcomes, these measures can be considered a consequence of development, 
but not its causes.  
These three «outcomes» may represent good policy choices, but not the institutions, as 
they represent mostly subjective assessments ex-post. More objective measurements are the 
constitutional measures of institutions, such as judicial independence, constitutional review, 
plurality and proportional representation, which are rather the classical choices. Table 9 
shows the correlation between these measures. The subjective measures are greatly correlated 
with the growth of GDP per capita, with each other, and very little with the objective 
measures of institutions. This fact points towards the hypothesis of reverse causality: they 
might be better in the places where there is a better economic situation. It is true that 
conventional measures of institutions, judiciary variables, are less correlated with growth as 
they are typically very noisy: what happens in reality isn’t exactly what is stipulated in the 
books of law. Even so, the fact that the most used measures of institutions are not correlated 
with the objective measures implies that they do not represent what institutions are actually 
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like, but rather circumstances of the political and social life. They can therefore change 
constantly, and become futile as measures. 
GLLS give examples of such fluctuations of assessment. ICRG (International Country 
Risk Guide) used in AJR, collected by Knack and Keefer (1995) is described as follows:“(…) 
in 1984, the top ten countries with the lowest expropriation risk include Singapore and USSR. 
(…) Between 1982 and 1997, Iran moves from the score of 1 (highest expropriation risk) to 9 
(close to the top score of 10), Libya from 1.5 to 9, and Syria from 1.5 to 9. We are not 
familiar with significant institutional constraints on the leaders of Iran, Libya, and Syria 
(…)”22  
Aggregated index of surveys for government effectiveness, employed by RST (2002), 
collected by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2003): « (…) the country that receives the 
highest score in the world is Singapore, a state known both for its one party rule and for this 
party’s chosen respect for private property. »23  
Constraints on executive, collected in Polity IV data: “The highest score for this 
variable is 7, the lowest is 1. The rich democracies, but also countries like Botswana, India 
and South Africa, tend to get the perfect score of 7. Dictatorships like Cuba, Iraq, North 
Korea, but also Pinochet’s Chile, get the worst score of 1, the communist countries such as 
China and USSR are in the middle with 3’s. It is difficult to see how property is more secure 
in Mao’s China than in Pinochet’s Chile, (…)”24. 
Secondly, GLLS proceed to a comparison between the institutional view and the neo-
classical approach. If one compares the measures for institutions with other possible causes of 
growth, like the accumulation of human capital, the results show that human capital is more 
persistent through time than any of those measures, a characteristic that North had found 
                                                 
22Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, “Do Institutions Cause 
Growth?”, NBER Working Papers No. 10568, 2004, p. 9. 
23Ibid., p. 10. 
24Ibid., p. 10. 
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essential to institutions. In table 5, GLLS regress growth of GDP by the decade variable on 
initial values of constrains on the executive25 and initial years of schooling, using the equation 
suggested by Barro, seen above, and which we repeat here: 
iiiiii ZQISYY εβββββ +++++= 40302010 ln)ln(        (12) 
where )ln( iY is the average income per capita from 1960 to 2000 (by decade: 60-70, 70-80, 
80-90, 90-00, and for the whole period 1960-2000), iY0ln  is the initial GDP in 1960, iS0  is 
the initial level of education in 1960, iQI0 is the measure for initial institutional quality 
(constraints on the executive in 1960), iZ  is for other variables (here: share of population 
living in temperate zone, 1995) and iε  is the error term. 
The results in Table 10 are striking: whereas human capital seems to be significant at 
all periods of time, constraints on the executive are significant only during the 80’s. The 
measures of institutions are not only less persistent in time than human capital, but they don’t 
predict the evolution of GDP. GLLS confirm the classical theory of growth, which puts the 
investment in human capital at the fore of development, presenting the political constraints as 
the consequence of this investment. 
Lastly, GLLS question the instrumental variable strategy that AJR use in order to 
demonstrate the primacy of institutions over all other causes of growth. In a  direct answer to 
AJR, GLLS declare that human capital performs better as a predictor of growth, today as well 
as in the past, casting doubt about AJR’s hypothesis that past institutions predict the level of 
institutions today through the settler mortality of the past. GLLS claim that the settler 
mortality instrument could be picking up all the effects of human capital. As figures 1, 2 and 3 
show, education in the present (years of schooling in 2000) as well as in the past (primary 
school enrollment in 1900) are inversely related to settler mortality, and positively related to 
                                                 
25 GLLS choose as measure of institutions the constraints on the executive, because they find it depends less on 
subjective judgment about institutions and more on the factual constraints to political power.  
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growth of output per capita (log GDP per capita 2000). In fact, the problem with the 
instrumental variables is that that they cannot tell what is the right chain of causality, what 
exactly is cause of what. “At a purely conceptual level one cannot infer from the patterns of 
European settlements that the asset being transplanted is institutions.” That asset might have 
been their human capital, as it could have been anything else, like «guns, germs and steel» for 
example, a hypothesis advocated by Jarred Diamond (1997)26.  
We are told that AJR’s instrument, settler mortality, is highly correlated with the new 
measures of institutions (executive constraints, expropriation risk, government effectiveness), 
but not at all or slightly correlated with constitutional measures (judicial independence, 
constitutional review, and plurality, proportional representation). Subsequently, the question 
arises: if there was an import of original institutions, especially through the form of legal rules, 
than one should see it in the laws. As no such correlation appears, the European settler 
mortality may indeed be instrumenting for something else than legal tradition. 
In conclusion, we see that for GLLS, this debate isn’t in reality about which are the 
best instruments to use in order to solve the endogeneity problem in asserting the influence of 
institutions on growth. The argument is more about the policy implications of a theory of 
economic growth for the developing countries. If one were to believe that institutions are the 
driving force behind development, one might end up encouraging the wrong policies to be 
implemented in a developing country. For example, the authors express skepticism at the idea 
of implementing democracy in a country with a level not high enough of human capital. This 
would eventually end up harming economic growth instead of stimulating it.
                                                 
26  Supporting Sachs, GLLS also test for correlation between settler mortality and the current disease 
environment, in order to show that this instrument could possibly catch the effects of malaria, for example, and 
not necessarily that of institutions (see table 11). The idea is the same, the instrument could in fact be correlated 
to the error term, so 0),( ≠iiMCov ε . At the same time GLLS report a two-stage regression, instrumenting 
executive constraints with settler mortality, or population density in 1500. Table 12 presents the results: human 
capital is the only significant variable for growth in the end.  
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Evaluation of Literature 
 
 
 
As we have seen from this analysis, the institutional view resorts to multiple empirical 
tests to find correlations between institutional measures and output per capita levels. What we 
never see are theoretical models of institutions. This literature tried to devise itself what it still 
needs in order to be a satisfying alternative to neo-classical theory of growth. As AJR admit: 
«(…) while we have good reason to believe that economic institutions matter for  economic 
growth, we lack the crucial comparative static results which will allows us to explain why 
equilibrium economic institutions differ (…).»27(italics in original). AJR call for a theory 
about the persistence of institutions and the construction of formal models that could 
incorporate the nature of political institutions, as they vary with each country.  
A few of the partisans of institutionalism point in a different direction, as is the case 
with Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002). RST suggest a separation between the 
theoretical idea of institutions and the actual implementation of this idea in practice through 
the form of public policies. What matters most for development economics should be the 
practical solutions to diverse situations. However these cannot be conceived in a theoretical 
model, but rather must be treated each according to its specific characterization. As Rodrik 
(2004) illustrates, the universal principles of economics are implemented in diverse ways in 
institutional arrangements. What policies have been applied in Japan, could not have given the 
same result in China, Korea or Mauritius, which are the principal success stories Rodrik talks 
about.  
                                                 
27Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2004), “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth”, in Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1, Edition 1, edited by Philippe Aghion and 
Steven Durlauf, 2005, p. 2. 
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We will detail these two positions in the conclusion of our paper, as this suggests for 
us future directions of research, when thinking about the importance of institutions. 
 
 
 
A Theory about Persistence of Institutions 
 
 
 
The way the new institutionalism describes the importance of institutions for growth is 
intrinsically linked to the chain of causality that they believe gave rise to these institutions. As 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) document with historical data, a region’s endowments  
determined the subsequent development. When Europeans came to the Americas, they created 
«bad», extractive institutions, in the places where natural endowments were favorable to 
exploitation and local population was abundant. In the regions where the climate was less 
welcoming, and the native population was less dense, the colonizers created «good» 
institutions, institutions that protected the property rights of individuals and gave way to legal 
equality. As it is costly to change the institutional framework, these institutions persisted to 
the present day. 
AJR agree that the initial inequality in wealth further contributed to restrain access of 
individuals to markets and thus was detrimental to development. When the industrial 
revolution took place, the regions that had inherited «bad» institutions became isolated from 
growth because the elites blocked efficiently any change. The institutions that encourage 
economic growth are the “good” institutions. They are the ones that secure property rights, 
have effective constraints on governments or power-holders and have relatively few rents that 
can be captured by power-holders.  
In general, such institutions are hard to implement if they do not already exist, as there 
is a fundamental problem of commitment on the part of power-holders. Even if these would 
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vow to commit to a set of institutions, that promise is never credible when it might hurt their 
status in society or affect the distribution of power overall and the allocation of resources 
between groups in society. The power-holders would always have an incentive to deviate 
since there is no impartial third authority able to guarantee enforcement of new rules. 
Therefore, for AJR, new institutionalism would lack a theory of political institutions which 
explains why institutions persist through time, and why they change28. 
The only problem is, as Przeworski (2004) points out, that it is reasonable to discuss 
the persistence of institutions, but we must know to which institutions we are referring to, and 
the literature on institutions presents very peculiar choices. In his paper, «Geography versus 
Institutions», he examines the measure of institutions most employed in the literature, the 
constraints on the executive, and shows that this measure presents a high level of volatility. In 
a different paper, Przeworski et al. (2000), he shows that institutions (as measured by political 
regimes) do indeed persist in time, and little institutional change has been observed until now. 
Hence, if we agree that institutions represent a long-lasting feature of social organization, then 
one cannot employ as measure of institutions something that changes frequently.  
The error might be at the core of the theory: the institutions we should look for as 
relevant to development are not in the first place those that protect property rights. As it seems 
well known in the literature, having political equality in a situation of economic inequality 
exacerbates the problems of distributions of resources and lowers investment. AJR themselves 
recognize that power holders tend to enforce their hold on property by legitimizing their 
claims with laws. These laws in turn make them stronger, rendering the development of 
«good» economic institutions for growth even less likely. Measuring the impact of institutions 
on growth through the lens of property rights cannot be a valid strategy, first, because this 
measure fluctuates throughout the period, when institutions are supposed to stay the same. 
                                                 
28 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004). 
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Second, even if property rights would measure institutions appropriately, this measure 
wouldn’t be relevant to development economics, as other types of institutions would come 
first in the assessment of stimulating growth.  
Looking at the data since 1500, Przeworski (2004) concludes that AJR’s chain of 
causality hides a major flaw: the institutions are described as instances not linked to time, 
independent of circumstances. This would imply that any type of institutions should function 
in the same way if transposed to a different time or place. This is a current identification 
problem that arises in instrumental variables procedures, for example. One can only speculate 
what would have happened with the same institutions, when conditions would have been 
reversed. As this is not possible to be known, or tested, because it has never happened, the 
most one can do is hope that what happens in reality is as assumed.  
As a result, the search for fundamental causes of growth might be futile. A more 
sensible quest could be to intensify the research in economic history and acquire more 
knowledge about each particular context. Institutions might matter for growth, but the form of 
these institutions is contingent on the histories of different peoples. Finding what is best for 
development also implies acquiring knowledge about each society and its ways of functioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
Property Rights as Measure of Institutions: Distinction between 
policy and Institutions 
 
 
 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) have an equally distancing position towards 
the institutional view as they explain, in the end of their paper, that one should distinguish 
between policies and institutions. For RST, past policies are what constitute the current 
institutions. They cannot be interpreted as separate things because institutional quality goes 
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through its capacity for change as well as its persistence through time. But it is nonetheless 
true that what interests us most is the effect of policies themselves on economic growth as 
they relate directly to possibility of action. “Our findings indicate that when investors believe 
their property rights are protected, the economy ends up richer. But nothing is implied about 
the actual form that property rights should take. We cannot even necessarily deduce that 
enacting a private property-rights regime would produce superior results compared to 
alternative forms of property rights”29, (underlined in original). China has never instituted a 
private rights regime, and yet it presents more reliability to investors than Russia, which 
officially has such a regime. 
The reason why differences in institutions persist might be because institutional 
measures incorporate a large amount of region specificity. A distinction needs to be made 
between sound economic principles, which are the same everywhere in the world, and a 
country’s specificity. This is the only conclusion possible, since we know from the recent past 
that applying the Washington Consensus 30  to developing countries resulted in a poor 
performance. China and India ended up developing more than Latin America. Therefore 
growth should not mean western growth, but whatever makes a specific society better off. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Rodrik Dani, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development", NBER, Oct. 2002, p. 21. 
30 The Washington Consensus outlined a number of rules to follow in order to ignite growth. These rules referred 
to fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, trade liberalization, secure property rights, etc. For an 
entire description see Rodrik (2004) in Handbook of Economic Growth ( edited by Philippe Aghion & Steven 
Durlauf, 2005). Rodrik gives multiple examples of development under different sets of rules, like the Chinese 
agricultural reform, which achieved full efficiency preserving the initial structure of society (which is indeed a 
very inspiring example, see p. 9).   
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Conclusion 
 
 
The papers we’ve looked at so far have tried to determine what stays at the core of the 
increase in GDP per capita. A better understanding of the causes of growth could bring us 
closer to a solution to the widening gap in incomes and put forward proper policies for 
developing countries to further development.  
The institutional view claims that institutions principally affect the evolution of future 
incomes in a country, influencing individual choice of investment in productive work, on 
which rests the possibility of a guaranteed participation in the returns to his investment. The 
geographical view criticized this and stated that the climate and location of a country defines a 
country’s potential for growth, as geography influences directly the different income per 
capita levels, providing the setting in which production takes place. The neo-classical 
approach showed that human capital accumulation is still by far the most reliable variable 
predicting growth.  
While there have been incontestable gains for health in the last century, such as life 
expectancy increase and infant mortality decrease, and thus a change in the geographical 
factors’ influence, economic prosperity had not been distributed equally over the world. 
Considerable difference in incomes per capita is the most important concern at the present 
time, especially as the gap seems to widen instead of closing itself. Considering likewise that 
growth is a recent phenomenon, if we look back two hundred years, so that this doesn’t 
constitute a historical necessity, the preoccupation with growth remains, since it would be 
very hard to think that different peoples around the world should have different standard of 
livings for no specific reason. 
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Table 1 
 
Source: Acemoglu Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, vol. 
91(5), pp. 1369-1401, 2001 
 
IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita 
 
Base 
sample 
(1) 
Base 
sample 
(2) 
Base 
sample 
without 
Neo-
Europes 
(3) 
Base 
sample 
without 
Neo-
Europes 
(4) 
Base 
sample 
without 
Africa 
(5) 
Base 
sample 
without 
Africa 
(6) 
Base 
sample 
with 
continent 
dummies 
(7) 
Base 
sample 
with 
continent 
dummies 
(8) 
Base 
sample, 
dependent 
variable is 
log ouput 
per worker 
(9) 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Average 
protection 
0.94 1.00 1.28 1.21 0.58 0.58 0.98 1.10 0.98 
against 
expropriation 
risk 1985-
1995 
(0.16) (0.22) (0.36) (0.35) (0.10) (0.12) (0.30) (0.46) (0.17) 
Latitude  -0.65  0.94  0.04  -1.20  
  (1.34)  (1.46)  (0.84)  (1.8)  
Asia dummy       -0.92 -1.10  
       (0.40) (0.52)  
Africa dummy       -0.46 -0.44  
       (0.36) (0.42)  
"Other" 
continent 
dummy 
      -0.94 -0.99  
       (0.85) (1.0)  
Panel B: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk in 1985-1995 
Log European 
settler 
mortality 
-0.61 -0.51 -0.39 -0.39 -1.20 -1.10 -0.43 -0.34 -0.63 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) 
Latitude  2.00  -0.11  0.99  2.00  
  (1.34)  (1.50)  (1.43)  (1.40)  
Asia dummy       0.33 0.47  
       (0.49) (0.50)  
Africa dummy       -0.27 -0.26  
       (0.41) (0.41)  
"Other" 
continent 
dummy 
      1.24 1.1  
       (0.84) (0.84)  
R2 0.27 0.30 0.13 0.13 0.47 0.47 0.30 0.33 0.28 
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares 
Average 
protection 
against 
0.52 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.46 
expropriation 
risk 1985-
1995 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Number of 
observations 
64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 61 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(8) is log GDP per capita in 1995, PPP basis. The dependent variable in column (9) is log 
output per worker, from Hall and Jones (1999). "Average protection against expropriation risk 1985-1995" is measured on a scale from 0 to 
10, where a higher score means more protection against risk of expropriation of investment by the government, from Political Risk Services. 
Panel A reports the two-stage least-squares estimates, instrumenting for protection against expropriation risk using log settler mortality; 
Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of the dependent variable against 
average protection against expropriation risk. Standard errors are in parentheses. In regressions with continent dummies, the dummy for 
America is omitted.  
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Table 2 
 
Geography and Health Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
Instrumenting only for average protection against expropriation 
_______________________________________ 
Instrumenting for all risk 
right-hand-side variables 
___________________ 
Yellow fever 
instrument for 
average 
protection 
against 
expropriation risk 
____________ 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 
Average 
protection 
against 
0.69 0.72 0.63 0.68 0.55 0.56 0.69 0.74 0.68 0.91 0.90 
expropriation 
risk,985-1995 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.28) (0.34) (0.24) (0.31) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.32) 
 
Latitude  -0.57  -0.53  -0.1      
  (1.04)  (0.97)  (0.95)      
Malaria in 1994 -0.57 -0.60     -0.62     
 (0.47) (0.47)     (0.68)     
Life expectancy   0.03 0.03    0.02    
   (0.02) (0.02)    (0.02)    
Infant mortality     -0.01 -0.01   -0.01   
     (0.005) (0.006)   (0.01)   
Panel B: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk in 1985-1995 
Log European 
settler mortality 
-0.42 -0.38 -0.34 -0.30 -0.36 -0.29 -0.41 -0.40 -0.40   
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)   
Latitude  1.70  1.10  1.60 -0.81 -0.84 -0.84   
  (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.40) (1.80) (1.80) (1.80)   
Malaria in 1994 -0.79 -0.65          
 (0.54) (0.55)          
Life expectancy   0.05 0.04        
   (0.02) (0.02)        
Infant mortality     -0.01 -0.01      
     (0.01) (0.01)      
Mean 
temperature 
      -0.12 -0.12 -0.12   
       (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   
Distance from 
coast 
      0.57 0.55 0.55   
       (0.51) (0.52) (0.52)   
Yellow fever 
dummy 
         -1.10 -0.81 
          (0.41) (0.38) 
R2 0.3 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.10 0.32 
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares 
Average 
protection 
against 
0.35 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.48 0.39 
expropriation 
risk, 1985-1995 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Number of 
observations 
62 62 60 60 60 60 60 59 59 64 64 
Notes: Panel A reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 1995, and Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stages. Panel C reports the coefficient from an OLS regression with log GDP per capita as the dependent variable 
and average protection against expropriation risk and the other control variables indicated in each column as independent variables 
(full results not reported to save space). Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (1)-(6) instrument for average protection against 
expropriation risk using log mortality and assume that the other regressors are exogenous. Columns (7)-(9) include as instruments 
average temperature, amount of territory within 100 km of the coast, and latitude (from McArthur and Sachs, 2001). Columns (10) and 
(11) use a dummy variable for whether or not a country was subject to yellow fever epidemics before 1900 as an instrument for 
average protection against expropriation.  
 
Source: Acemoglu Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, American Economic Review, vol. 
91(5), pp. 1369-1401, 2001 
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Table 3 
 
2SLS regression of log income 1995 as a function of institutional quality and malaria risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Paper AJR AJR AJR AJR EL EL EL EL RST RST RST RST 
Dependent 
variable 
logpgp95 logpgp95 logpgp95 logpgp95 logpgp95 lgdppc95 lgdppc95 lgdppc95 lgdppc95 lcgdp95 lcgdp95 lcgdp95 
Independent 
variable 
            
 0.29 0.45 0.53 0.56         
 (2.87) (3.03) (3.06) (4.12)         
kk (Institutions 
Index) 
    1.38 1.32 1.59 1.51     
     (3.40) (3.60) (4.24) (4.45)     
Rule         0.60 0.53 0.78 0.68 
         (3.45) (2.74) (5.60) (4.01) 
MAL94P -1.43 -1.07   -1.32 -1.37   -1.33 -1.43   
 (-3.99) (-2.83)   (-2.55) (-2.76)   (-4.60) (-4.37)   
MALFAL   -1.04 -0.83   -1.15 -1.20   -1.13 -1.25 
   (-2.74) (-2.47)   (-2.35) (-2.52)   (-4.53) (-4.26) 
R2 0.73 0.69 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.63 0.78 0.71 0.77 0.68 
N 101 59 73 59 62 62 62 62 133 69 133 69 
Instruments for 
variables above 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
KGPTEMP, 
ME 
KGPTEMP, 
ME, 
LOGMORT 
t-statistics are indicated in parentheses. 
All regression equations are estimates with two-stage least squares and include a constant term (not reported). 
First-stage regressions and (where relevant) overidentification tests support the use of the instruments in each case. 
MALFAL and LOGMORT cover slightly different countries across papers, for consistency the corresponding authors' version of the variable is used. 
The sample size in each regression varies slightly compared to the original regressions in AJR, EL and RST, respectively, due to differing coverage of the malaria and KGPTEMP variables. These minor variations in sample size do 
not appear to affect the substantive results. 
 
Source: Sachs, Jeffrey D., “Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income”, NBER Working Paper No. w9490, 2003. 
 
 
 
 40
 
 
Table 4 
 
GDP per capita growth before and after malaria eradication in southern 
European countries (late 1940s) 
 GDP p.c. growth Difference w/W. Europe 
 1913-38 1950-55 1913-38 1950-55 
Greece 2.1 3.6 1.1 1.3 
Italy 1.0 5.3 0.1 3.0 
Spain -0.4 6.2 -1.4 4.0 
Western Europe 0.9 2.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Table 5 
 
GDP per capita growth before and after malaria eradication in Portugal (1958) 
 1953-58 1958-63 Change 
Portugal 3.0 5.3 +2.3 
Western Europe 1.9 3.8 +1.9 
Difference +1.1 +1.5 +0.4 
 
 
Table 6 
 
GDP per capita growth before and after malaria eradication in Taiwan (1961) 
 1956-61 1961-66 Change 
Taiwan 2.8 5.8 +3.0 
East Asia 3.4 5.5 +2.1 
Difference -0.6 +0.3 +0.9 
 
 
Table 7 
 
GDP per capita growth before and after malaria eradication in Jamaica (1961) 
 1956-61 1961-66 Change 
Jamaica 3.4 4.1 +0.7 
Central America and Caribbean 2.6 3.1 +0.5 
Difference +0.8 +1.0 +0.2 
 
Source : Gallup, John Luke, and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The economic burden of malaria”, The 
American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, vol. 64(1,2)S, pp. 85–96, 2001. 
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Table 8 
 
 
GDP Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 gr6590 gr6590 gr6590 gr6590 gr6590 
(TSLS) 
gr6590 gr6590 
GDP p.c. 
1965 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 -2.6 -2.7 -2.3 -2.4 
 (7.70) (8.02) (8.06) (7.87) (7.60) (7.41) (7.09) 
Years of 
secondary 
schooling 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
 (1.75) (1.77) (1.32) (1.34) (1.15) (0.81) (0.89) 
Log life 
expentancy 
1965 6.6 5.5 4.3 3.3 2.4 4.1 3.4 
 (7.23) (6.21) (4.45) (3.60) (1.79) (4.53) (3.89) 
Trade 
Openness 
1965-90 (0-1) 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 
 (5.49) (4.79) (4.79) (4.70) (4.39) (4.79) (4.66) 
Public 
Institutions (0-
10) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 
 (3.08) (2.63) (3.32) (3.92) (3.66) (3.20) (3.47) 
LDistance  0.0      
  (0.24)      
Pop100km 
(%)  1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6   
  (3.07) (3.01) (2.64) (1.91)   
Tropical area 
(%)  -0.9 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 
  (2.28) (1.35) (1.09) (0.82) (1.89) (1.44) 
Malaria index 
1966   -1.2 -2.0 -2.6 -0.9 -1.6 
   (2.15) (3.60) (3.87) (1.86) (2.89) 
dMal6694    -2.5 -4.5  -1.9 
    (3.93) (2.12)  (2.94) 
Log coastal 
density      0.3 0.2 
      (4.91) (4.34) 
Log inland 
density      -0.1 -0.1 
      (2.26) (1.60) 
Constant -8.9 -4.1 1.3 5.9 9.8 0.7 4.1 
 (2.90) (1.17) (0.34) (1.57) (1.76) (0.19) (1.08) 
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
R² 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.82 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
 
Source : Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger, “Geography and 
Economic Development”, NBER Working Paper No. w6849, 1998.  
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Table 9 
 
Correlations of measures of institutions 
 Log GDP 
per 
capita 
(2000) 
Executive 
constraints 
(1960-
2000) 
Expropriation 
risk (1982-
1997) 
Autocracy 
– Alvarez 
(1960-
1990) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(1998-2000) 
Judicial 
independance 
(1995) 
Constitutional 
review (1995) 
Plurality 
(1975-
2000) 
Executive 
constraints 
(1960-2000) 0.7119a        
Expropriation 
risk (1982-
1997) 0.7906a 0.6378a       
Autocracy -- 
Alvarez (1960-
1990) -0.7388a -0.8567a -0.6864a      
Government 
effectiveness 
(1998-2000) 0.7860a 0.6349a 0.8297a -0.5908a     
Judicial 
independence 
(1995) 0.0279 0.3465a 0.2629b -0.1907 0.3006b    
Constitutional 
review (1995) -0.0649 0.1904 0.1189 -0.0278 0.0482 0.2243c   
Plurality (1975-
2000) -0.2620a -0.3570a -0.1918b 0.2472a -0.2044a  -0.0992 0.0040 
Proportional 
representation 
(1975-2000) 0.2947a 0.3158a 0.2172b -0.2151b 0.2052b -0.1684 0.1284 -0.6118a 
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent. 
 
Source : Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, “Do Institutions Cause Growth?”, NBER Working 
Papers No. 10568, 2004. 
 
 
 43
Table 10 
 
Economic growth, initial constraints on the executive and initial human capital 
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per 
capita for each decade between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period. The specifications include a constant but we do not 
report the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 Panel A: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade 
between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000 
Share of 
population living 
in temperate 
zone (1995) 0.0290a 0.0225a 0.0294a 0.0085 0.0253a 
 (0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0039) 
Log initial GDP 
per capita -0.0059 -0.0032 -0.0079b 0.0021 -0.0079a 
 (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0025) 
Initial executive 
constraints 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0027b 0.0006 0.0013 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0009) 
Observations 77 99 102 95 72 
R2 17% 6% 19% 6% 34% 
      
 Panel B: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade 
between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000 
Share of 
population living 
in temperate 
zone (1995) 0.0136b 0.0204a 0.0220a 0.0123c 0.0175a 
 (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0049) 
Log initial GDP 
per capita -0.0027 -0.0158a -0.0103b -0.0048 -0.0092a 
 (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0034) 
Log initial years 
of schooling 0.0075b 0.0147a 0.0114a 0.0102c 0.0073a 
 (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0024) 
Observations 79 86 90 82 71 
R2 22% 24% 16% 9% 38% 
      
 Panel C: Dependent variables are the growth rates of GDP per capita for each decade 
between 1960 and 2000 and for the whole period 
 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000 
Share of 
population living 
in temperate 
zone (1995) 0.0270a 0.0191a 0.0218a 0.0135c 0.0255a 
 (0.0085) (0.0070) (0.0082) (0.0077) (0.0048) 
Log initial GDP 
per capita -0.0141a -0.0130b -0.0146a -0.0073 -0.0189a 
 (0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0034) 
Initial executive 
constraints -0.0004 -0.0017 0.0031b 0.0014 0.0008 
 (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0008) 
Log initial years 
of schooling 0.0116a 0.0140a 0.0105b 0.0104c 0.0096a 
 (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0028) 
Observations 61 80 86 81 57 
R2 33% 20% 20% 9% 55% 
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent. 
 
Source : Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, 
“Do Institutions Cause Growth?”, NBER Working Papers No. 10568, 2004. 
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Table 11 
OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries 
The table shows OLS regressions for the cross-section of countries. The specifications include a constant but we do not report 
the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 Dependent variables: 
 
Executive constraints 
(1960-2000) 
Expropriation risk 
(1982-1997) 
Autocracy -- Alvarez 
(1960-1990) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(1998-2000) 
Log settler mortality -0.4351b -0.3543b 0.0938c -0.2034b 
 (0.1965) (0.1764) (0.0507) (0.0918) 
Population at risk of 
malaria (1994) -1.5215a -0.9679b 0.4397a -0.7745a 
 (0.5504) (0.3731) (0.1597) (0.2133) 
Observations 
 74 66 74 77 
R2 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.43 
a=significant at 1 percent; b=significant at 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent. 
 
Table 12 
Economic development, instrumental variable regressions 
The table shows instrumental variables regressions for the cross-section of countries. Panel A reports the second-stage 
estimates from instrumental variables regressions with first-stage estimates shown in Panel B. The dependent variable in both 
second-stage specifications is the log of GDP per capita in 2000. Panel B reports the first-stage estimates for two sets of 
instruments. The first specification instruments executive constraints and years of schooling using the log of settler mortality 
and French legal origin. The second specification instruments executive constraints and years of schooling using the log of 
population density in 1500 and French legal origin. The specifications in both stages include a constant but we do not report 
the estimates in the table. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 Panel A: Second-stage regressions 
 Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2000 
 (1) (2) 
Years of schooling 
(1960-2000) 0.7894a 0.4836b 
 (0.2753) (0.1875) 
Executive constraints 
(1960-2000) -0.3432 -0.2965 
 (0.2577) (0.2410) 
Share of population 
living in temperate 
zone (1995) -1.6969 -0.0863 
 (1.2053) (0.7714) 
Observations 47 55 
R2 0.31 0.5 
 Panel B: First-stage regressions 
 Dependent variables: 
 Executive constraints 
(1960-2000) 
Years of schooling 
(1960-2000) 
Executive constraints 
(1960-2000) 
Years of schooling 
(1960-2000) 
Share of population 
living in temperate 
zone (1995) -0.1195 3.4975a -0.0353 2.8397a 
 (0.7202) (0.8044) (0.8359) (0.8933) 
Log settler mortality -0.8212a -1.0183a   
 (0.2053) (0.2293)   
Log population density 
in 1500 -0.3737b -0.6140a   
 (0.1582) (0.1691)   
French legal origin -1.4124a -0.3770 -1.1988b -0.5329 
 (0.4258) (0.4757) (0.4538) (0.4850) 
Observations 47 47 55 55 
R2 0.53 0.70 0.25 0.55 
F-Test for excluded 
instruments 17.23 4.70 
Correlation of 
predicted values of 
executive constraints 
and years of schooling 
0.8182 
 
0.8163 
 
a=significant at the 1 percent; b=significant at the 5 percent; c=significant at 10 percent. 
Source : Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, Andrei Shleifer, 
“Do Institutions Cause Growth?”, NBER Working Papers No. 10568, 2004. 
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Figure 1 
Years of schooling (2000) and Log settler mortality 
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Figure 2 
Primary school enrollment (1900) and Log settler mortality
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Figure 3 
Log GDP per capita (2000) and Primary school enrollment (1900) 
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Source : Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger, “Geography and 
Economic Development”, NBER Working Paper No. w6849, 1998.  
 
 
 


